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1 Introduction
Medicare, the main health insurer for the elderly and disabled, was introduced by the U.S.
government in 1965 to help the elderly to finance their medical expenses. Its original de-
sign was based on the typical health insurance plan existing in 1965, which did not include
prescription drug benefits. In the practice of modern medicine, however, prescription drugs
play an increasingly important role, and today’s private health insurance plans usually in-
clude prescription drug coverage. Medicare has only recently adapted to these changes by
the enactment of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act in
December 2003, which came into effect in January 2006. This is considered to be the largest
expansion of Medicare benefits since its inception. A major policy concern with this new
legislation is its cost, which is expected to be about $700 billion over the next ten years.1
Advocates of the benefit argue that prescription drugs will improve health, and may even be
cost-effective in decreasing the utilization of inpatient and/or outpatient care. This point is
emphasized by President George W. Bush: “Medicare should cover medications to keep our
seniors out of the hospitals. The new bill does this... It will save our government and the
taxpayers money by providing prescription drugs early so we don’t have to pay for it in long
hospital stays and invasive surgeries.”2 Despite these claims, very little is known about how
large these savings will be, or if indeed there will be any at all. In addition, the long-run
effects of the policy on life expectancy and health care utilization have not been considered in
the administration’s cost estimates. If prescription drugs are a substitute for other forms of
medical care in the production of health, an increase in prescription drug utilization may im-
prove health outcomes and reduce the utilization of inpatient and outpatient care. However,
over the long run it may also increase life expectancy and enlarge the population eligible for
Medicare benefits, increasing the cost of the program.
This paper contributes to the policy debate by quantifying the effect of the new prescrip-
tion drug benefit on mortality, morbidity and the degree of substitution between prescription
drugs and outpatient and inpatient care. In addition, it estimates the take-up rate of the
1Estimates from the Congressional Budget Office, see CBO (2004).
2Speech of November 25, 2003.
2
new benefit and the crowding-out effect it imposes on alternative sources of prescription drug
coverage for the elderly. This paper is the first attempt to evaluate the impact of the policy
in a way that accounts explicitly for its unique and unprecedented actuarial design as well as
for the scheduled evolution of its premium. In particular, for the elderly with income above
150% of the federal poverty line, the prescription drug benefits can be obtained by paying
a premium of $35 per month ($420 per year), with an annual deductible of $250. After the
deductible amount is reached, the package provides 75% coverage for the next $2000. Be-
tween $2250 and $5100 of total prescription drug costs, the elderly are responsible for 100%
of drug expenditures: this $2850 gap is often referred to as the “doughnut hole.” After this
point, at which the out-of-pocket expenditures have reached $3600, the beneficiary then gets
95% coverage for prescription drugs.3 Figure 1 illustrates the design of the new prescription
drug benefit. To provide incentives to sign up for the plan early, the policy has a dynamic
component, with plan premiums scheduled to increase by 1% per month after its introduc-
tion. The effects of a policy like the one just described have not been studied in the health
economics literature.
Medicare is a large program, accounting for 2.7% of the United States’ GDP. Therefore, it
is important to understand the behavior of the Medicare population and how their behavior
will respond to policy interventions such as the one described above. As has been docu-
mented in Arrow (1963), Pauly (1968) and Pauly (2004), the availability of prescription drug
insurance may increase prescription drug utilization by lowering the marginal cost of a pre-
scription to the individual, a phenomenon known in the health economics literature as moral
hazard. The magnitude of the moral hazard effect that the new prescription drug benefit
will induce is not known, as well as the impact of increased prescription drug utilization on
health, on mortality, and on the utilization of other types of medical care. Assessment in this
case is particularly challenging due to the absence of post-policy data. A behavioral model
is required to permit extrapolation from observational data to the new policy regime. In this
paper, I adopt the following strategy: first, I develop a model that represents the dynamic
3For the low-income elderly, prescription drugs are available for a small or no premium and deductibles,
and there is no doughnut hole in coverage.
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optimization problem that the elderly solve when choosing their consumption, supplemental
health insurance and medical care utilization. Second, I estimate the parameters of the model
using a subsample from the longitudinal Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) and
examine the goodness-of-fit of the model in explaining the observed choices.4 Third, the
estimated model is used to predict the behavior of the elderly under the new environment,
which now includes a voluntary and subsidized prescription drug insurance option.
The backbone of the analysis is a dynamic model of investment in health in the tradition
of Grossman (1972), which is extended to include health insurance. Previous research in
health economics have also structurally estimated Grossman-type models. Two noteworthy
contributions are Gilleskie (1998) and Khwaja (2003). Gilleskie (1998)focuses on the working-
age population and models the decisions of whether to be absent from work or go to the
doctor during an acute health episode. In that paper health insurance is exogenous which is
a sensible assumption given the short horizon of the optimization problem. Khwaja (2003)
focuses on the Medicare population and studies the effects of Medicare on incentives and
outcomes of elderly men by comparing the baseline with a counterfactual in which Medicare
did not exist, and also by increasing the age of Medicare eligibility. In that paper, health
insurance is treated as a choice, however, medical care is treated as a composite good and
therefore, that model cannot be used to study the impact of the new prescription drug benefit.
In this paper, at each period the forward-looking individual chooses, conditional on state
variables, her supplemental health insurance, which may or may not include prescription drug
coverage. The individual also chooses her prescription drug and outpatient care utilization,
which, together with inpatient care, are inputs into a health production function. The health
production function represents the technological process by which medical care translates
into health. Substitutions and complementarities in the production of health are allowed
among the medical inputs. The health production function underlies the observed transitions
between health states, which in this paper are self-reported health status plus death. Self-
reported measures of health and disability have been documented as good predictors of true
4Due to data limitations the model is estimated on elderly women living alone. The specific limitations
are explained in the data chapter.
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health and disability by Benitez-Silva et al. (2004), Rust and Phelan (1997) and Bound
(1990). Consistent with Grossman’s framework, the demand for medical care is in part
derived from the demand for health. The model allows for uncertainty over future health
states and survival, as well as for unobserved sources of heterogeneity. Having recovered the
behavior structure of the dynamic optimization problem, the new prescription drug benefit
is introduced as a counterfactual experiment.
The results of the policy experiment reveal that prescription drug expenditure increases
by about 24% when the new Medicare drug program is made available. Prescription drugs
have a positive impact on health; however, the improvement in health is not translated into
lower outpatient and inpatient care utilization in the aggregate. In fact, outpatient and
inpatient care expenditure increase due to the extension of life for the individuals in poor
health status, who are the main medical care spenders. As a measure of cost-effectiveness of
the new policy, the cost of extending life by one year is calculated to be between $38,000 to
$62,000, depending on adjustments for quality of life. The take-up rate of the new benefit
reaches 85% by the fifth year. The availability of the new drug benefit crowds out demand for
existing prescription drug coverage alternatives, although the average risk of people making
these insurance choices improves. The 1% increase in premiums over time, which is intended
to stimulate early enrollment in the program, is predicted to have no effect in front-loading
enrollment. A higher marginal increase in premium would be required to induce changes in
the timing of enrollment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional
background that determines the choices available to the elderly and reviews the existing
literature. Sections 3 and 4 present the details of the model and explain how the model is
solved. Section 5 provides an overview of the data, and section 6 explains the estimation
technique. section 7 comments on the results of the estimation, section 8 discusses the
counterfactual experiments, and section 9 concludes.
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2 Background and Institutions
When Medicare was introduced in 1965, it was composed of two parts. Part A is the Hos-
pital Insurance, which covers, up to some limit of days, acute hospital care, skilled nursing
home after hospitalization, and hospice care for the terminally ill. Enrollment in Part A is
automatic once citizens start collecting Social Security. Part B is the Supplemental Med-
ical Insurance, which covers mainly physician services, outpatient diagnostic tests, medical
supplies and equipment. Although enrollment in Part B is voluntary and requires paying a
premium, about 95% of the elderly enroll in Part B.5 The Part B premiums finance around
one quarter of total Part B expenditures, and the rest is financed through general taxes.
Even with the two parts, there are gaps in Medicare coverage. The two programs have
deductibles and copayments, and the biggest gap is the absence of prescription drug coverage.
To fill these gaps, the elderly can buy private plans called “Medigap,” which in addition to
covering considerable portions of the Part A and B deductibles and copayments may also
include prescription drug coverage. Around 10% of the elderly obtain prescription drug
coverage through self-purchased Medigap policies. These policies typically cover 50% of the
total prescription drug expenditures and are capped at a limit of either $1,250 or $3,000 in
total prescription drug expenditures. Another source of supplemental insurance is employer-
provided plans, which are offered by former employers as retirement benefits at a reduced
premium (typically 50%). These plans may also include prescription drug coverage. Previous
employers’ retiree health benefits are currently the main source of prescription drug coverage
for the elderly, accounting for 33% of the Medicare beneficiaries.
Since 1973, Medicare beneficiaries have also had the option of enrolling in a Medicare
HMO as an alternative to traditional Medicare coverage. Although Medicare HMOs have
been an option since the seventies, this option was enhanced in 1982 with the passing of the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA), which simplified the contracts between
Medicare and the HMOs and allowed the existence of risk contracts between them. The
market share of this option was negligible until the early nineties, and its growth coincided
5In 2005 the premium is $78.20 per month.
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with the growth of the commercial HMO industry. Medicare HMOs, together with other
managed care options, constitute Part C of Medicare, nowadays called Medicare Advantage;
however, Medicare HMOs continue to be the most popular option in Part C. If the elderly
enroll in a Medicare HMO, the firm receives a capitation payment from the government, and
in exchange, the firm must provide benefits equivalent to Parts A and B. In addition, the
HMO may charge the beneficiary a small premium and provide additional benefits such as eye
care, dental care and prescription drugs. Under Medicare HMOs, the elderly are constrained
in their choices of medical care providers to the ones included in the HMO’s network. This
feature may explain why, despite the HMO plans’ generosity, only 17% of the Medicare
population enrolls in HMOs. Around 15% of Medicare beneficiaries obtain prescription drug
coverage from Medicare HMOs. Drug coverage has been identified by Town and Liu (2003)
as a dimension of competition between Medicare HMOs operating in the same county. There
is an extensive literature that documents favorable selection in the Medicare HMO industry,
i.e., the average risk of the Medicare HMO enrollees is lower than the risk of those enrolled
in the traditional fee-for-service sector (see for example Riley et al. (1994), Morgan et al.
(1997), Brown et al. (1993)).
Although almost 75% of the elderly have prescription drug coverage of some sort, the typ-
ical coverage is far from being comprehensive. Prescription drugs represent only 8% of total
medical expenses; however, they constitute a large percentage of the elderly’s out-of-pocket
payments. It has been documented in the literature that insufficient or absent prescription
drug coverage leads to under-utilization of prescription drugs. For example, Steinman et al.
(2001) find that the elderly with chronic conditions who lacked drug coverage, were more
likely to “stretch” prescriptions by skipping doses, or avoid using medications. Other studies
find a positive correlation between prescription drug insurance and prescription drug utiliza-
tion (see for example Lillard et al. (1999), Davis et al. (1999), Stuart and Grana (1998)).
Similarly, Adams et al. (2001) and Blustein (2000) find that the use of anti-hypertensive
drugs among Medicare beneficiaries with hypertension is higher among those with more
generous drug coverage. This finding is also supported by experimental evidence from the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment, reported by Keeler et al. (1985), who find that hyper-
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tensive patients with free care had higher utilization of prescription drugs than those who
had less comprehensive insurance.6 Federman et al. (2001) find that the use of reductase
inhibitors (statins), a class of relatively expensive drugs that improve survival probability
among patients with coronary heart disease, is higher among those who have prescription
drug coverage. Focusing on the Medicare HMO industry Gowrisankaran and Town (2005)
find that enrollment in managed care without prescription drug coverage significantly in-
creases county-level mortality, whereas no significant effects were found for Medicare HMOs
with drug coverage.
Recent independent work by Yang et al. (2004) study the impact of extending existing
drug coverage options such as Medicaid and private insurance to all Medicare beneficiaries.
Their paper extends the existing literature by taking into account the effects that universal
prescription drug coverage would have on the elderly. The approach followed in Yang et al.
(2004), however, does not allow them to study the impact of the actual new policy. Instead,
they approximate the policy by assuming that everyone has either a Medigap policy with
existing drug coverage benefits, or everyone enrolls in Medicaid with existing coverage. For
the policy experiments they perform, they provide estimates of the effect of prescription
drugs on health and life expectancy.
In contrast, in this paper, because the optimization problem of the elderly is solved
explicitly, the impact of the actual prescription drug benefit can be assessed, taking full
account of its actuarial design and the scheduled increase in the premium over time. Because
the new prescription drug benefit is introduced as a new choice, the policy experiments
performed in this paper can also provide a forecast of enrollment in the new program, and
the crowding-out effect it imposes on existing supplemental insurance options. By forecasting
enrollment, and characterizing the population that takes up the new benefit, the cost of the
program can be estimated. The results of this paper show that enrollment in the new benefit
is not universal, particularly during the first five years (the horizon of their forecast). This
paper also provides measures of the cost-effectiveness of the policy, and assesses alternative
6Although instructive, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment is not directly informative on the behavior
of the elderly, given their exclusion from the experiment.
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designs of the program.
Medicare has limited its role to the provision of insurance for inpatient and outpatient
care. This effectively distorts the relative prices perceived by the Medicare beneficiaries
for the different medical care inputs, which may discourage the utilization of prescription
drugs in favor of other kinds of inputs. The first attempt to provide a prescription drug
benefit was in 1988, with the Medicare Catastrophic Act, which was meant to protect the
elderly from large out-of-pocket expenses in prescription drugs. The method used to finance
these benefits was unusual in Medicare, because it required the elderly to finance the benefit
themselves without any subsidy from the working-age population. Premiums differed by
income, i.e., the higher-income beneficiaries would subsidize the lower-income beneficiaries.
The dissatisfaction with the new bill among the well-to-do elderly caused the U.S. Congress
to repeal this piece of legislation in 1989. Two lessons were learned: cross subsidizing within
Medicare was not politically feasible, and the benefits to the elderly should be subsidized by
the working age population.
Enacted in December of 2003, the Medicare Prescription Drug , Improvement and Mod-
ernization Act, creates a new drug benefit as Part D of Medicare. This new benefit will pay
for outpatient prescription drugs through private plans, beginning January 1, 2006. Medicare
beneficiaries can remain in the traditional Fee-for-service (FFS) program and enroll in a pri-
vate prescription drug plan (PDP), or they can enroll in an integrated Medicare Advantage
plan for all Medicare benefits. Enrollment in either plan is voluntary, and the contract is for
one year. The government expects to finance 25% of the program with premiums collected
from the elderly whose income is above 150% of federal poverty line, and the remaining
portion with general taxes from the working age population.
This paper provides an ex-ante evaluation of the short-run and long-run impacts of this
new benefit, taking into account all the relevant features of the new policy. It also estimates
the take-up rate and characterizes the subset of the population taking up the new option,
which are important determinants of the cost of the program. It assesses the benefits of the
program in terms of changes in health status and increases in lifespan.
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3 Model
This section develops the behavioral model that represents the dynamic optimization prob-
lem that the elderly face when deciding their supplemental health insurance, medical care
utilization and consumption of non-medical goods. The model starts at age 65, at which age
the elderly become eligible for Medicare, and represents the behavior of one individual.
Choice set At each age a, the elderly decide, conditional on state variables, the health
insurance they will hold during the year, the amount of medical care to be consumed and
the consumption of non-medical goods. Their per-period choice of health insurance, hia, is
one of seven mutually exclusive alternatives, which vary in several dimensions such as pre-
mium, coverage, and providers’ network size. Figure 2 represents the supplemental insurance
options available to the elderly. The first alternative is to hold the traditional Medicare
fee-for-service without supplemental insurance. This option includes the benefits of both,
Part A and Part B of Medicare.7 The second option includes in addition to Parts A and B
of Medicare a self-purchased supplemental policy (Medigap) with drug coverage. The third
option differs from the second in that the supplemental policy is provided by the former
employer as part of retirement benefits. Typically, the employer pays for half of the supple-
mental insurance’s premium. Because of the difference in the elderly’s premium expenditure
it is important to distinguish between self-purchased and employer-provided supplemental
insurance. The fourth option includes, in addition to the benefits of Part A and Part B, a
self-purchased Medigap policy without drug coverage and the fifth differs from the fourth
in that the supplemental insurance is employer-provided. Option 6 is Medicare HMO with
drug coverage and option 7 is Medicare HMO without drug coverage. The main difference
between Medicare HMOs and the fee-for-service scheme of options 1 to 5 is that the network
of health care providers is more restricted in the case of Medicare HMOs. A summary of the
characteristics of each health insurance option is provided in the data section. The size of
7Enrollment in Part A is automatic once the elderly start collecting Social Security. Although enrollment
in Part B is optional, about 98 % of the sample is enrolled in Part B, therefore modeling its choice separately
would unnecessarily complicate the model.
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the choice set depends on the eligibility for employer provided health insurance. If available,
the elderly are allowed to choose among the seven options described above, however, if not,
the choice set will not contain options 3 and 5. The eligibility for employer provided health
insurance is not directly observable in the data, therefore, the elderly are assumed ineligible
if they are never observed to hold an employer provided supplemental policy in the data.
Medical care consumption decisions are made by choosing, at every age, the expenditure
in outpatient care and prescription drugs for the year. It may be argued that prescription
drug consumption is not a choice but a passive action after physicians’ recommendations,
however, it is well documented (see section 2) that the elderly respond to financial incen-
tives by skipping doses or “stretching” their prescriptions because of cost. I assume that
inpatient care is not directly a choice, but rather assigned by a doctor, taking into account
health status. Thus, from the point of view of the individual, inpatient care is a stochastic
process that may be indirectly influenced by prior health input choices. The expenditure
on outpatient care at age a, denoted oa is allowed to take 3 values: low, medium and high.
Expenditure in outpatient care is considered low if it is at the lowest third of the distribution
of outpatient care. Medium and high outpatient expenditure are similarly defined. In the
data, most of the elderly are observed to have at least one outpatient event during the year,
therefore, zero expenditures are not allowed. The expenditure in prescription drugs at each
age, Rxa is allowed to take five values, including no consumption. The positive values for the
drug expenditure are the average prescription drug expenditures for each of the four regions
constituting the policy design, which in Figure 1 are labeled deductible, partial coverage,
doughnut hole and catastrophic coverage. The choice of consumption in non-medical goods,
Ca is obtained from the budget constraint as the residual from income minus the premiums
paid minus the expenditure in medical care.
Preferences The preferences over consumption, health status, health insurance and med-
ical care are represented by the per-period utility function8
8The exact functional forms are provided in the appendix
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ua = u(Ca, Ha, Rxa, oa, ia, hia−1, hia; εa, µ) (1)
where Ca, Rxa and oa are, as defined in the previous section, the consumption of non-medical
goods, prescription drugs and outpatient expenditure respectively. Inpatient care expenditure
is denoted by ia. The different types of medical care are assumed to enter the utility function
to reflect the possible disutility individuals receive from medication’s side effects or from
undergoing medical procedures. The variable hia denotes the health insurance chosen at age
a, which can be one of the seven alternatives defined above. The utility function incorporates
a psychic switching cost, which is borne when the health insurance choice of the current period
differs from the previous period choice. This cost represents the cost of learning a new set of
rules and adjusting to a new insurance policy. In addition, there is a cost of being enrolled
in a Medicare HMO, which represents the disutility of having restricted access to health
care providers. The elderly also derive direct utility from their health status,Ha, which can
take one of four values: (0) dead, (1) poor/fair, (2) good and (3) excellent/very good. The
utility obtained when dead is normalized to 0. There is a random shock to preferences for
health insurance and medical care, εa, which is assumed i.i.d. extreme value distributed. µ
represents permanent differences across individuals in their preferences for HMO enrollment.
In the application, the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be discrete
with a finite number of support points, which are referred to as “types” (see Heckman and
Singer (1984)).
Budget Constraint At each age a the elderly spend their income, denoted Ya, on con-
sumption, Ca, health insurance premiums, pia and out-of-pocket payments for the portion of
medical care expenditure that is not covered by the health insurance chosen at the beginning
of the period, xa.
Ya = Ca + pia + xa (2)
Annual income is modelled as a function of education, e, and age. Educational attainment
is classified into five categories: (1) Primary school or less, (2) high school dropout, (3) high
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school graduate, (4) college dropout, (5) college graduate. Income is obtained only when
alive. The income process includes a random shock, εya, whose distribution is log-normal
Ya = y(e, a; ε
y
a, µ) (3)
The premium paid at age a, pia, depends on the health insurance option chosen at the
beginning of the period. Define the dichotomous variable bhia to take the value of 1 if health
insurance option hi is chosen, 0 otherwise, and denote pihi the value of the premium of
alternative hi. The premium paid at age a can be written as
pia = pi
1b1a + pi
2b2a + pi
3b3a + pi
4b4a + pi
5b5a + pi
6b6a + pi
7b7a (4)
The out-of-pocket expenditure at age a also depends on the chosen health insurance
option. Define cRx,hi, co,hi, ci,hi as the co-payments for prescription drugs, outpatient care
and inpatient care respectively, associated with insurance option hi. These coefficients are
contained in the interval [0,1] and represent the fraction of the total expenditure in medical
care that the elderly are responsible for. The out-of-pocket expenditure can thus be written
as
xa = Rxa(c
Rx,1b1a + c
Rx,2b2a + c
Rx,3b3a + c
Rx,4b4a + c
Rx,5b5a + c
Rx,6b6a + c
Rx,7b7a)
+oa(c
o,1b1a + c
o,2b2a + c
o,3b3a + c
o,4b4a + c
o,5b5a + c
o,6b6a + c
o,7b7a) (5)
+ia(c
i,1b1a + c
i,2b2a + c
i,3b3a + c
i,4b4a + c
i,5b5a + c
i,6b6a + c
i,7b7a)
The value of the premiums and co-payments for each alternative is obtained as the average
of the alternative-specific premiums and co-payments observed in the data.
Health production technology In this model, the stock of health is determined en-
dogenously by the elders’ decisions about medical care utilization. The stock of health is
therefore modelled as an asset the elderly invest in through their medical care utilization,
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and the transitions between different health states are governed by a health production func-
tion. Prescription drugs, outpatient and inpatient care are inputs of the health production
function, and therefore, its demand is in part a derived demand for health (Grossman (1972)).
As explained above, the expenditure in prescription drugs and outpatient care are directly
chosen by the individual, and the expenditure in inpatient care is modelled as a stochastic
process that can be indirectly affected through health by previous choices. Because of the
high skewness in the distribution of inpatient care, with many elderly having no hospital-
izations during the year, a two-part model is adopted, where the first part represents the
probability of having any inpatient event. The logistic functional form is adopted to model
this probability, which depends on health status and age.
Pr(ia > 0) = Λ(Ha, a) (6)
The second part models the value of inpatient expenditure, conditional on any, as a
function of health status plus a log-normal shock. An unobserved permanent component is
also included.
ia = i(Ha; ε
i
a, µ)
The measure of health used to model the health state is people’s self-reported health
status. In the survey the elderly are asked to rank their health in 5 categories: excellent,
very good, good, fair, poor, which are ordered. Due to the low number of people reporting
extreme health statuses, respondents that report excellent and very good health status are
pooled in one category, and also are the ones reporting fair and poor health status. This
reclassification keeps the ordered feature of the individuals’ responses and simplifies the
computation of the solution of the model by decreasing the number of possible health states.
Death is added as an extra health state, which is absorbing. It is assumed that the elderly
observe a continuous health status, H∗a , and they report a discrete value Ha, depending on
the location of H∗a with respect to cutoff points that will also be estimated as parameters of
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the model. In particular,
Ha =


0 if H∗a < κ1
1 if κ1 ≤ H
∗
a < κ2
2 if κ2 ≤ H
∗
a < κ3
3 if κ3 ≤ H
∗
a
(7)
Given the ordered feature of the health status, and an extreme value distribution assump-
tion on the health shock, the health state transitions are modelled as ordered logit processes.9
The health production function is specified in a flexible fashion, allowing the index of the
ordered logit to be different depending on current health status (see the appendix for the
precise functional form). This specification allows differences in the productivity of medical
care for different health statuses. The different kinds of medical care (prescription drugs, out-
patient care and inpatient care) enter the health production function as inputs. Substitutions
and complementarities between them are allowed in the production of health, and quadratic
terms are also included to capture diminishing marginal product of the health inputs. The
specification of the health production function includes also the effect of smoking behavior
and the depreciating effect of age on health. Unobserved permanent components are allowed
in the depreciation rate of health with age.
H∗a+1 = f
Ha(Rxa, oa, ia, S, a; ε
h
a, µ) (8)
State space The state space, Ωa, contains all the information the elderly need in order to
solve the dynamic optimization problem described from (1)-(8). The elements of the state
space are: the current period’s self-reported health status, Ha, which is assumed to be a
sufficient statistic for H∗a in the health production function, the previous period’s health
insurance choice, hia−1, education, e, history of smoking behavior,S, access to employer pro-
vided supplemental insurance, ep, age, a, the characteristics of the health insurance options
9For details on the derivation of the ordered logit’s functional form see Small (1987).
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summarized in the vectors of premiums, p˜ia, copayments for prescription drugs, c˜
Rx
a , for out-
patient care, c˜oa, and for inpatient care, c˜
i
a, the random components known to the individual
at the beginning of each period but unknown to the econometrician, and the permanent
components of preferences and health production technology, denoted µ.
Ωa = {Ha, hia−1, a, e, S, ep, p˜i, c˜
Rx, c˜o, c˜i; ε˜a, ε
i
a, ε
y
a, ε˜
h
a, µ}
The law of motion for the health state is given by the health production technology, the
previous period health insurance corresponds to the health insurance decision made at age
a−1, and age evolves deterministically. Given the advanced age of the individuals, education
and smoking history is assumed to be static, therefore, they could be classified as observed
permanent components or observed heterogeneity. Because of the data limitations regarding
eligibility for employer provided health insurance, which were mentioned in the choice set
section, this variable is also assumed to be part of observed heterogeneity.
The optimization problem Although there is a terminal age A = 100, at which the
elderly are assumed to die with certainty, the model allows for stochastic transitions to death
before the terminal age, depending on the amount invested in health in earlier periods. The
length of each period is one year . The individuals maximize, subject to the budget con-
straint and laws of motion presented above, the expected discounted value of their remaining
lifetime utility by choosing, conditional on states, Ωa, the optimal sequence of controls j. A
choice consists of all the feasible combinations of hia, oa and Rxa. The maximized expected
discounted value of remaining life time utility at age a, is given by
Va(Ωa) = max
j∈J
E[
A∑
a=a0
δa−a0ua|Ωa] (9)
where δ is the discount factor. Define the dichotomous variable dja, which takes a value of 1
if alternative j is chosen at age a, 0 otherwise. The value function in (9) can be written as
Va(Ωa) = max
j∈J
V ja (Ωa)
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with the alternative-specific value functions obeying the Bellman equation
V ja (Ωa) = u
j
a(Ωa) + δE[Va+1(Ωa+1)|Ωa, d
j
a = 1] if a < A (10)
VA(ΩA) = u(YA, HA) if a=A
In the last period the elderly are assumed to consume all their income and enjoy their health
stock, however, they do not invest in health given that death is realized with certainty. The
expectation in (10) is taken with respect to all the random components of Ωa.
4 Solution Method
The finite horizon dynamic programming model is solved by backwards recursion. For nota-
tional simplicity, a partition of the state space is made with Ω¯a denoting the set of predeter-
mined components, and Ω¯a the stochastic components. At age A, the elderly are assumed to
die with certainty. The value of death is normalized to 0 and there is no bequest motive. At
age A − 1, given a particular value of the deterministic components of the state, Ω¯A−1, the
elderly draw random shocks from the distribution of the stochastic components of the state
space, Ω¯A−1, they calculate the alternative-specific utility functions, shown in (1), and choose
the alternative that gives the highest reward. At ageA−2, given Ω¯A−2, the alternative-specific
value functions, shown in (10), need to be computed. This requires a high order integration
over the distribution of age A−1 shocks to obtain E[VA−1(ΩA−1)|ΩA−2, d
j
A−2 = 1]. To simplify
this step, the unobserved taste components of the utility function, εa in equation (1), are
assumed to be additively separable, independent and identically extreme value distributed,
which implies a closed form solution for the integrals over the taste parameters.10 Small and
Rosen (1981) show in a consumer surplus calculation context that the expected maximum of
utilities that are iid extreme value distributed take the log-sum functional form. Define u¯a
to be the utility function in (1), net of the unobserved taste component. The integral over
the shocks to preferences, conditional on shocks to income and inpatient expenditure, can be
10This assumption has been commonly adopted in the literature dealing with estimation of dynamic pro-
gramming models, see for example Rust (1987), Khwaja (2003), Gilleskie (1998)
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computed as
ln[
J∑
m=1
exp {u¯mA−1(ΩA−1)|Ω¯A−2, d
j
A−2 = 1, ε
y
A−1, ε
i
A−1}] (11)
The shocks to the log of income and inpatient expenditure, assumed normally distributed,
are integrated out by simulation as follows: I take R draws from the bivariate normal dis-
tribution,11 for each of those draws r calculate the expected maximum of utilities in (11),
and take the average over draws. Thus, the expectation of the next period value function at
period A− 2 is obtained as
E[VA−1(ΩA−1)|ΩA−2, d
j
A−2 = 1] =
1
R
R∑
r=1
ln[
J∑
m=1
exp {u¯mA−1(ΩA−1)|Ω¯A−2, d
j
A−2 = 1}]r (12)
Once (12) is calculated, the alternative-specific value functions are known up to the random
shocks of period A−2. The elderly receive such shocks and therefore, the alternative-specific
value functions can be computed
V
j
A−2(ΩA−2) = u
j
A−2(ΩA−2) + δE[VA−1(ΩA−1)|Ω¯A−2, d
j
A−2 = 1] (13)
The elderly choose the option with the highest value. Consequently, the expected maximum
at period A − 3 is E[max{V 1A−2(ΩA−2), . . . , V
J
A−2(ΩA−2)}|Ω¯A−3, d
j
A−3 = 1]. In summary, in
order to obtain the expected maximum of the alternative-specific value functions at every
age a, the alternative-specific value functions at age a + 1 should have been computed in
advance for all possible values of the predetermined state space, Ω¯a+1, that may be reached
from Ω¯a, given that alternative j is chosen at age a. This procedure continues, until the
initial age a0. Because the individuals contained in the sample are observed at a point in
the middle of their Medicare eligibility period, a0 corresponds to the first year they are
observed, and the initial conditions will be the ones prevailing at that age. In a model where
people invest in their health through medical care, the initial health status will be affected
by previous investments implying non-exogeneity of the initial conditions. The way I address
this problem is explained in section 6.
11In the application R=50
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5 Data
The data used for estimation comes from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS),
in particular, the Cost and Use files for years 1994 to 1999. The survey is conducted by
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and is a stratified random sample of
approximately 12,000 Medicare beneficiaries. The MCBS is a rotating panel, and an individ-
ual is observed for at most three years. The Survey includes information on demographics,
socioeconomic status, health status, and utilization of medical care. The MCBS records
utilization and expenditures on various types of medical care, such as physician services,
inpatient hospital services, and prescription drugs. The expenditures in these services, the
amounts paid by the different insurers and the out-of-pocket payments are available in the
survey. Self-reported events are validated by Medicare claims. The elderly were interviewed
three times per year. In the first interview, information on demographics, insurance and
health status is collected. In addition, in the same interview the elderly are asked to save all
their bills for medical care in order to keep track of their expenditures. The information on
expenditures is recorded in subsequent interviews.
The focus is on aged Medicare beneficiaries, and therefore, only those 65 years old and
above are included in the analysis. Other than the surveyed individual, it is not possible
to observe the health insurance, medical care expenditures and demographics of the other
members of the household. This prevents the analysis from considering joint decision making
of the household members. Moreover, due to the generality of the only question on income,
to make sure that the quantity reported is the disposable income for the surveyed individual,
I only include in my analysis elderly living alone. Due to the low number of men that live
alone, the focus is on elderly women age 68 and older.12 Institutionalized elderly are also
12The model could also be estimated for men living alone, I take women as the first step since they
constitute around 60% of the Medicare population. With data on households, the model can be extended
to include joint decision making, however no such data with the richness on medical care utilization and
health insurance providers as MCBS were available at the beginning of this project. Because few people were
observed between the ages of 65 and 67, and those were in an unusually bad health status, in order to avoid
misleading conclusions, individuals in that age range were excluded from the sample.
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excluded from the sample, because their prescription drugs consumption is not reported.
The estimating sample contains 1,805 individuals, each of whom is observed for two to three
periods.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. The insurance option with the highest enroll-
ment is traditional Medicare plus a self-purchased Medigap policy without prescription drug
coverage, which accounts for 36% of the sample. Consistent with the population, most of the
elderly in the sample are enrolled in fee-for-service Medicare (85%), and the remaining 15%
obtain their health insurance through Medicare HMOs. Among those who enroll in Medicare
HMOs, 80% do so in plans with drug coverage, which is consistent with findings in Town
and Liu (2003), Brown et al. (1993), Morgan et al. (1997) and Riley et al. (1994), who argue
that one of the most appealing features of Medicare HMOs plans is the prescription drug
coverage. The percentage of individuals in the sample that have prescription drug coverage
is 44%. Despite the availability of prescription drug coverage for some elderly, the out-of-
pocket expenditures for this input are much higher as a percentage of the total than the
other medical inputs. This is true even conditioning on having prescription drug coverage.
The expenditure on prescription drugs for the sample is, on average, $890, with 91% of the
elderly filling at least one prescription.13 Virtually everyone in the sample has at least one
outpatient event, therefore, zero outpatient care is not allowed as a choice in the model. The
average expenditure on outpatient care is approximately $3,120. In contrast to outpatient
care, the percentage of people having any inpatient events is only 19%. The average expen-
diture on inpatient care for the whole sample is $2,365, however, this value is much higher if
the average is calculated conditional on any inpatient care ($12,214).
The variable used to measure health is the self-reported health status. This measure of
health, although subjective, has proven to be a good predictor of true health status (see for
example Benitez-Silva et al. (2004)) and is highly and negatively correlated with the number
of chronic conditions and number of physical limitations that the elderly exhibit. In the
survey the elderly rank their health status into five mutually exclusive categories: Excellent,
13All expenditure data is expressed in dollars of 1999 by using the Consumer Price Index of Medical
Services.
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very good, good, fair, poor. Due to the low number of observations in the excellent and
poor categories, these categories are combined with very good and fair, respectively. In the
data, 48% of the sample exhibit excellent/very good health, 32% are in good health, and
the remaining 20% is in the poor/fair category. Death is added as an additional state. The
average age is 79 years and individuals have an average of 11.45 years of schooling. Among
the sampled elderly, 33% have access to employer provided health insurance, and 44% have
ever smoked.
As expected, and consistent with Grossman’s model, the consumption of medical care
is decreasing with improvements in health status. The consumption of every medical input
decreases monotonically with health state. These facts are shown in Table 2. The elderly in
poor/fair health spend, on average, roughly double in prescription drugs and outpatient care
than individuals in excellent/very good health. Table 2 also shows the average expenditure
in inpatient care by health status, both unconditional and conditional on having an inpatient
event.
The transitions between the different health states are shown in Table 3. The transitions
to death are more frequent from the worst health state, and the probability of dying decreases
as greater health is reported. All three health states exhibit persistence, with the good health
state being the least persistent. The health transitions matrix will also be revisited when the
results and the model’s prediction for the health transition matrix are discussed.
Table 4 shows the health insurance transitions matrix. It can be seen that all health
insurance alternatives exhibit persistence, which in the model is captured through a switching
cost parameter. Apart from the persistence, two other patterns are worth noticing. (1)
The majority of the elderly that held a supplemental plan and switched from it, enroll in
an option with supplemental insurance that shares the self-purchased or employer-provided
characteristic of the original option. This suggests that if the elderly do not have access
to employer-provided benefits, they are not likely to obtain them in the future, and the
elderly that have access to employer-provided benefits are likely to take them, either with
prescription drug coverage or without. (2) Switches from (to) Medicare HMOs to (from) the
fee-for service options are very rare. It is also surprising that despite its generosity, only
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13% of the sample enrolls in Medicare HMOs. These facts motivate the inclusion of a cost
of enrolling in a Medicare HMO due to restricted access to medical care providers. This cost
is assumed type-dependent, i.e., there is a type of person for which enrolling in an HMO
implies bearing a smaller restricted access to providers cost.
The characteristics of each insurance option are shown in Table 5. These characteristics
are obtained by averaging over the individuals that held the same health insurance over
the year and from alternative data sources such as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services and the American Association of Retired Persons. The premiums for the insurance
options that include supplemental insurance are the most expensive. Among the elderly that
hold supplemental insurance, the ones that hold employer-provided policies, pay less for their
insurance because the former employer usually pays half of it as retirement benefits. The lower
cost of supplemental insurance premiums and the lower co-payments for prescription drugs
for the elderly with employer-provided benefits, creates the need to distinguish them from
the self-purchased alternatives in the empirical analysis. The premiums shown for Medicare
HMOs correspond to the additional premium that the HMOs may charge the elderly on top
of the capitation fee paid by the government. The copayments for outpatient and inpatient
care that the elderly with Medigap are responsible for, are lower than the ones the elderly
face under the Medicare only option. This is not surprising given that Medigap policies were
created to “fill the gaps” of Medicare coverage. The copayments for prescription drugs for
the Medigap options are 50% by the mandated design of Medigap policies H, I and J. This
shows that despite the availability of prescription drug coverage, they are far from being
comprehensive. Moreover, the Medigap policies that cover prescription drugs have a cap at
$3,000 of total expenditure on prescription drugs.
6 Estimation
The model described above, represents the decision process of the elderly. The parameters of
the model are estimated by maximizing a likelihood function that specifies the joint proba-
bility of observing the sequence of choices and outcomes observed in the data. The observed
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choices are health insurance, prescription drugs and outpatient expenditure, and the observed
outcomes are the amount of inpatient care consumed, the elders’ income and health status.
The construction of the likelihood function is described in this section.
The solution of the model, made explicit in section 4, provides the alternative-specific
value functions, which are, for given parameter values, known up to the random components
of the state space. Therefore, conditional on Ω¯a, the probability of the elderly being observed
to choose alternative j, corresponds to the integral over the region of random shocks such
that option j has the highest value.
Pr(djt = 1|Ωa, µ) = Pr(V
j
a > V
1
a , V
j
a > V
2
a , . . . , V
j
a > V
J
a |Ωa, µ) (14)
Pr(djt = 1|Ωa, µ) = Pr(u
j
a + δE[Va+1(Ωa+1|Ωa, d
j
a = 1)] > (15)
uka + δE[Va+1(Ωa+1|Ωa, d
k
a = 1)]) ∀k 6= j
Pr(djt = 1|Ωa, µ) = Pr(ε
j
a − ε
1
a > u¯
1
a − u¯
j
a + δE[Va+1(Ωa+1|Ωa, d
1
a = 1)]−
δE[Va+1(Ωa+1|Ωa, d
j
a = 1)], . . . , ε
j
a − ε
J
a > u¯
1
a − u¯
J
a + (16)
δE[Va+1(Ωa+1|Ωa, d
1
a = 1)]− δE[Va+1(Ωa+1|Ωa, d
J
a = 1)])
Given the iid extreme value distribution assumption imposed on the unobserved taste
component, the choice probabilities can be computed analytically and have the familiar
multinomial logit functional form
Pr(dja = 1|Ωa, µ) =
expV j(Ωa)∑
j′ expV
j′(Ωa)
(17)
It should be noted that, unlike their static counterpart, the choice probabilities in (17)
are not subject to the independence of irrelevant alternatives criticism, because the value
functions entering the exponentials contain, in addition to current period utility, the opti-
mal decisions in future periods (Rust (1987), Rust (1994)). For estimation purposes, these
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probabilities can be considered as functions of the parameters of the model conditional on
the data.
The model represents the behavior of a single agent, and observed differences in the
behavior of individuals with the same initial conditions arise due to iid shocks to preferences,
income, inpatient expenditure and health. Some behaviors observed in the data, such as HMO
enrollment, appear to be more persistent than what observed state variables could capture.
To capture this persistence in behavior, the model allows for permanent components that
are unobserved to the econometrician. The distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity
is assumed to be discrete with finite support points (Heckman and Singer (1984)). In the
application, two support points or “types” are allowed.14 To solve the initial conditions
problem pointed out in section 4, it is assumed that the type probabilities can be represented
as functions of the initial state variables, therefore, the initial state variables are exogenous
conditional on type. The specification of the type probability considers the following trade-off:
the more flexible the functional form assumed, the closer to its true structure; however, the
more flexibility, the more parameters there are to be estimated. The functional form assumed
for the type probability is a logistic function of initial state values for age, HMO enrollment,
health, high-school graduation, past smoking, and availability of employer provided health
insurance.
The likelihood function is a mixture of the type-specific likelihoods, with weights equal
to the probability of being of a certain type. Thus, the contribution to the likelihood from
individual n is
Ln(Θ) =
K∑
k=1
τk|Ω0
A∏
a=a0
{Pr(dja = 1|Ωa, µ)[Pr(ia > 0|Ωa, µ)φln i(·|Ωa, µ)]
I{ia>0} (18)
·[1− Pr(ia > 0|Ωa, µ)]
I{ia=0}φln y(·|Ωa, µ)
3∏
h=0
Pr(Ha+1 = h|Ωa, µ)
I{Ha+1=h}}
where the first term is the probability if choosing alternative j, which to be computed,
requires the solution of the complete dynamic programming problem. The second term is the
14In the discussion of the results, they be referred to as the “HMO type” and the “non-HMO type”
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probability of having any inpatient care event, and the third is the probability of observing
a particular expenditure in inpatient care, with φ(·) being the normal density function. The
fourth term is the probability of not having any inpatient event, and the next term is the
the probability of observing a particular income. The last term are the health transition
probabilities generated by the health production function. All the parameters of the model
enter the choice probabilities. A subset of parameters enter through the other structural
equations described in (18).
The likelihood function for the whole sample is
L(Θ) =
N∏
n=1
Ln(Θ)
The estimation algorithm alternates between the solution to the dynamic programming model
and the computation of the likelihood. At each iteration the optimization routine obtains
a new set of parameters for which the model is solved and the probabilities in (18) are
computed. The optimization routine uses the Nelder-Mead method.
7 Results
7.1 Parameter estimates
The details about the parameterization of the model are made explicit in the appendix.
The parameter estimates and their standard errors are reported in Table 6. Although the
parameter values are not easily interpretable on their own, there are some qualitative features
of the estimates that are worth emphasizing. The constant relative risk aversion parameter
(CRRA) is estimated to have a value of 0.28, implying that the utility function is concave
but fairly linear in consumption. This parameter value is close to what previous works in
empirical microeconomics have obtained; see for example Todd and Wolpin (2003).15 As
expected, the elderly attach a positive value to their health. The results of the estimation
15The literature on macroeconomics and finance have obtained more concave utility functions. A summary
of the CRRA coefficients obtained by this literature can be found in Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000).
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suggest that the elderly derive disutility from medical care. In the case of prescription drugs,
this disutility could be interpreted as side effects, or the inconvenience or restrictions on daily
life of having to remember the timing to take their medications. In the case of outpatient
and inpatient care, this disutility can be interpreted as the discomfort that some medical
procedures generate. Although undesirable, the elderly consume medical care because of its
impact on the stock of health, which provides positive utility. The impact of each medical
care input on health is presented in Table 7. The first column of the table shows the change
in the odds of either staying in the same health status or improving, given a 10% increase
in the utilization of prescription drugs, holding constant outpatient and inpatient care. It
can be seen that prescription drugs have a positive impact on health, and their impact is
inversely related to health status, i.e., their impact is the biggest for people in poor/fair health
status, and the smallest for people in the excellent/very good category. A 10% increase in
prescription drug utilization improves the odds of either staying in the same health status
or transiting to a better one by 2.9%. The same analysis holds for outpatient care. On the
other hand, an increase of 10% in inpatient care utilization appears to decrease the odds of
either staying in the same health status or improving when the elderly are in the poor/fair
health status. This is not surprising given that with considerable frequency, individuals who
die present positive inpatient care utilization prior to death, and the probability of dying is
higher for those individuals in poor/fair health. The parameters of the probability of being
hospitalized show that this probability decreases the higher the health status, but increases
with age. The expenditure in inpatient care also decreases the better the health status, and
this expenditure differs by type. Individuals of type II (HMO types), spend on average $4,000
less on inpatient care (conditional on any) than individuals of type I. The depreciation rate of
the health stock with age is smaller for the HMO types, which, together with the fact that the
probability of being an HMO type increases with initial health, provides additional evidence
that Medicare HMOs may be experiencing favorable selection. As an interesting byproduct
of the analysis, the cost of joining a Medicare HMO for the non-HMO types, interpreted
as the utility loss of having restricted access to medical care providers, is estimated to be
around $24,000.
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An important finding is that the different medical inputs are estimated to be substitutes
for each other in the production of health, which answers one of the initial questions of this
paper.
7.2 Within sample fit
I next describe how the model’s predictions compare to the data. Table 8 compares the health
transition matrix predicted by the model with its data counterpart. The model captures the
persistence in health status, predicting probabilities of remaining in the same health status
nearly identical to the ones observed in the data. The increasing probability of dying as
health deteriorates is also captured by the model. The off-diagonal elements of the health
transitions matrix are also close to the values observed in the data. Table 9 shows the model’s
fit with respect to the health insurance choices. The model is able to capture the persistence
in this choice and also the transition pattern within the HMO choices. The probability
of dropping self-purchased Medigap policies is over-predicted by the model. This is to be
expected given the parsimony of the model in terms of the supplemental health insurance
switching cost (only one parameter).
The performance of the model in predicting prescription drug, outpatient care and inpa-
tient care utilization by age are reported in Figures 3, 4 and 5 respectively. The model is able
to predict well the average prescription drug utilization by age, and its decreasing trend, as
shown in Figure 3. In the case of outpatient care utilization, the model matches closely the
pattern of the data, except for the 95 year-old elderly, who show a sudden increase in out-
patient care utilization, which may be explained by the small number of observations in the
95 year-old category (15 observations). With respect to inpatient care utilization, the model
predicts the increasing trend with age observed in the data; however, the model is not able to
reproduce all the variation observed in the data. Figure 6 shows the predictions of the model
for the probability of being hospitalized by age, along with its data counterpart. The model
is able to fit quite closely this feature of the data, although the quality of the fit decreases
after age 90, at which age the data shows a more pronounced increase in the probability of
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being hospitalized than what the model can generate. The poorer fit at very old ages is likely
explained by the small number of observations at the top of the age distribution.
As shown in the data section (Table 2), the expenditure in medical care differs by health
status, decreasing the higher the health status. Figure 7 shows the average expenditure in
prescription drugs by health status and the corresponding predictions of the model. The
model captures the decreasing pattern of the expenditure on prescription drugs with health,
and also closely matches the levels for each health status. Similarly, the predictions for the
average expenditure on outpatient care, conditional on health status, are shown in Figure
8. The figure shows that the decreasing pattern of outpatient care utilization with health
is also reproduced by the model, although the model tends to over-predict outpatient care
expenditure among those who are in poor/fair health status by 24%, and under-predict the
average utilization of the healthiest elderly by about 30%. Figure 9 shows that the basic
pattern exhibited by inpatient care utilization is also captured by the model, although the
model tends to over-predict the expenditure in inpatient care among the elderly in poor/fair
health status by about 18%.
Finally, Figure 10 shows the model’s fit for the average income by age. It can be seen
that the model performs well, capturing both the decreasing trend of income by age, and the
main aspects of the variation in income.
8 Counterfactual experiments
After the parameters of the model are estimated, the impact of the new Medicare prescription
drug benefit can be assessed by simulating the decisions of the elderly under the new envi-
ronment, which now includes a voluntary prescription drug coverage. In addition, alternative
policies are evaluated, such as increasing and decreasing the scheduled percentage increase
in premium for the new benefit.
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8.1 Policy Experiment 1: Implementing Part D
The first policy experiment consists of implementing the policy as it is, including its unique
actuarial design (described in the introduction), and the increment in premiums of 1% per
month from the benefit’s introduction. The policy therefore implies perturbing the budget
constraint shown in equation 2. The out-of-pocket payments will now include, if the new
benefit is chosen, all the thresholds contained in the design of the policy. In addition, the
premium for the new benefit is allowed to increase 9.6% per year in real terms. Therefore,
the year of sign-up is now added as a state variable and the model has to be solved again
in order to be able to calculate the expected discounted values of future utility, now taking
into account that the consequences of not signing up in this period include an increase in
the premium paid in the next period. The impact of the policy over a period of ten years is
compared to a ten-year baseline, which assumes no changes from the current situation. The
policy simulation is performed by simulating 50 replicas of each individual in the data, i.e.,
90,250 people are simulated. Figure 11 shows that the new policy will increase the average
expenditure on prescription drugs by about 24% with respect to the baseline. In addition, the
out-of-pocket payments will be greatly reduced, from about 75% under the baseline to 49%
once the new benefit is introduced. The new benefit, contrary to the administration’s beliefs,
will not induce savings in outpatient or inpatient care, but will increase the expenditure
in both of them. Figure 12 shows that outpatient care utilization increases as a result
of the policy by about 3.3% . The increase in inpatient care is relatively small (0.3%),
but the important point to emphasize is that the simulations do not predict savings as
the government expressed in President Bush’s speech. Although prescription drugs were
estimated to be substitutes for inpatient and outpatient care in the production of health, their
positive impact on health causes a reduction of mortality for a small fraction of the elderly.
These new survivors are predicted to spend their extra years mainly in the poor/fair health
category, and therefore consume large amounts of medical care. The results of the policy
experiment are presented in Table 10, which shows the aggregate impact of the policy as well
as its impact on two subgroups: those who survive both under the baseline and the policy
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experiment (anyway survivors), and those who survive only once the policy is implemented
(new survivors). It can be seen in the table that the government’s perceptions coincide with
the results obtained for the anyway survivors. That is, prescription drugs improve the health
status of the elderly, increasing slightly the proportion of people in the excellent/very good
category, and decreasing the proportion of people in poor/fair health status. The expenditure
in outpatient care for this subgroup declines by 4.2% and the expenditure in inpatient care
declines by 13.7% due to the improvement in the general health status. However, those
savings are outweighed by the increase in inpatient and outpatient care expenditure of the
new survivors. Their increase in expenditures is due to the extension of their lives and the
bad health status in which they spend those extra years. In fact, 63% of the new survivors
spend the extra years lived in bad health status. The outpatient care expenditure for the
new survivors increases by 69.3% and inpatient care expenditure increases by 98.1%. The
policy decreases mortality by 0.12 years on average, and as a measure of cost-effectiveness of
the new benefit, the average cost of the extra year of life is calculated to be $38,300. If this
cost is adjusted by a crude measure of quality of life, the cost of the extra year lived is about
$62,050.16 If these values are compared to the standard $100,000 used in the literature for
the value of a year of life (see for example Cutler and Richardson (1998), Gowrisankaran and
Town (2005), Cutler and McClellan (2001), the new prescription drug benefit appears to be
cost-effective.17
The enrollment in the new prescription drug benefit is predicted to exhibit a concave
profile over time. Figure 13 shows that enrollment starts at about 40% in the first year,
and increases at a decreasing rate, reaching 85% by the fifth year. This result is important
16The literature on quality-adjusted life years (QALY) assumes that a year lived in perfect health has a
value of 1, and a year lived with certain condition falls between 0 and 1. This literature calculates coefficients
for conditions; however, there are no QALY measures for self-reported health status. For the back-of-the-
envelope calculations done in this paper, it is assumed that a year of life in poor/fair health status is 0.5,
good health is 0.75 and excellent/very good corresponds to 1.
17Cutler et al. (1999) argue that the value of life for the elderly may be lower than $100,000 per year.
It is enough that the value attached to the extra year lived is 0.38 of a healthy year for the policy to be
cost-effective.
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given that the government’s estimates have assumed a constant 85% enrollment during the
10-year period. The government expects to finance 25% of the program with the collected
premia. To test whether the lower than predicted enrollment will compromise the expected
financing of the program, the percentage financed with premia is calculated and reported
in Table 11. The table shows that the financial goal of the government is met for every
year, but the first. During the first year it is expected that the program will be financed
with a higher contribution from the tax-payers, due to the fact that the elderly below 150%
of poverty line, who do not pay a premium for the new benefit, react more quickly to the
introduction of Part D. This is shown in Figure 14. In addition, the new benefit causes
a sizable crowding-out effect over the existing supplemental health insurance alternatives.
Figure 15 shows the proportion of people who enroll in the new benefit by the last year of the
simulation, categorized by their original supplemental health insurance option. It can be seen
that those who were in original Medicare without any supplemental insurance are the ones
that react the most to the presence of the new prescription drug benefit. A similar reaction is
obtained from the elderly who held self-purchased Medigap policies. This is to be expected,
given that when the policy is introduced they can buy a 75%-subsidized prescription drug
coverage, which is cheaper than buying the Medigap insurance. The groups that react the
least are those who held employer provided health insurance with prescription drugs and
those who had Medicare HMO with drug coverage. This can be explained by the fact that
these plans are in general more generous relative to the Medigap plans. Although the new
benefit imposes a big crowding-out effect on existing supplemental health insurance options,
it improves their average risk, defined as the proportion of people in the different health
states that enroll in each health insurance alternative. Figure 16 shows graphically that after
the introduction of the new prescription drug benefit, there is a considerable increase in the
proportion of people in excellent/very good health status who enroll in the previously existing
supplemental insurance options, and a corresponding decrease in the proportion of people in
poor/fair health status. This change in the risk composition for the existing alternatives may
lead to a decrease in their premia. These general equilibrium effects cannot be captured by
this partial equilibrium model, and will be explored in future research.
31
8.2 Policy Experiment 2: Assessing the Effect of the Monthly 1%
Increase in Premium
The design of the Part D benefit includes a scheduled 1% nominal increase in premiums
per month if the elderly do not enroll in the new benefit at the beginning of the program.
The purpose of including this feature is to promote early enrollment in the new benefit,
and therefore avoid adverse selection. Because all monetary values are expressed in real
terms, it is assumed that the 12.6% nominal increase in the Part D premium per year will
be equivalent to an increase of 9.6% per year in real terms. To evaluate the impact on
enrollment of this percentage increase in the new benefit’s premium, the results of the policy
simulation presented in the previous section are compared to a new simulation that keeps
the benefit’s design in every respect, but sets the annual percentage increase in premium
to 0%. No changes in enrollment are observed between the two scenarios. This is to be
expected because the premium is 75% subsidized; therefore, the elderly perceive a large
expected benefit from a prescription drug insurance that is acquired for a small premium.
In fact, to obtain front-loading in enrollment, the policy would need to be made actuarially
unfair. Figure 17 shows that an increase in enrollment in the early years of implementation
is obtained given that a 400% increase in the Part D premium is introduced. Although early
enrollment is obtained, the take-up rate in future years is greatly reduced.
9 Conclusions
This paper developed and estimated a dynamic behavioral model of the elderly’s demand for
supplemental health insurance and medical care. The model incorporated decisions about
supplemental health insurance, prescription drug utilization, outpatient care utilization, and
consumption. The decisions about prescription drug utilization and outpatient care utiliza-
tion, together with inpatient care utilization, were considered as inputs of a health production
function, which drives the dynamics of the health status. Health was the only asset in the
model, and the elderly invested in their health stock through medical care. The model was
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estimated for a sample of elderly women living alone using panel data from the Medicare Cur-
rent Beneficiary Survey. The estimated model provided a reasonable fit to various relevant
features of the data.
The estimated model was used to study the impact of the newly enacted Medicare pre-
scription drug benefit on the elderly’s medical care utilization, life expectancy and health
outcomes. Because the new prescription drug benefit will come into effect in January 2006,
no post-policy data are available, and therefore, the behavioral model is required to permit
extrapolation from observational data to the new policy regime. The model was able to
incorporate all the relevant features of the actuarial design and pricing of the new policy
in doing the assessment. The model forecasts that, as a result of the policy, there will be
an increase in the utilization of prescription drugs, which have a positive impact on health
and a negative impact on mortality. Prescription drugs were estimated to be substitutes
for outpatient and inpatient care in the production of health, and for the majority of the
elderly (those who survive both under the baseline and under the new environment), this
translates into lower inpatient and outpatient care expenditures. However, the reduction in
expenditures for this group are outweighed by the increase in the utilization of inpatient and
outpatient care by those elderly who live at least one extra year as a result of the policy.
They will spend a big proportion of those extra years in poor/fair health, and will therefore,
be big spenders of medical care. This will cause the expenditures on inpatient and outpatient
care to increase in the aggregate, contrary to the government’s beliefs. The average cost of
extending life by one year is estimated to be between $38,000 and $62,000, depending on
adjustments for quality of life. This cost is small compared to the value attached to an extra
year of life that is commonly used in the literature.
The government’s predictions were made based on a constant 85% enrollment in the new
benefit; however, the model predicts that this level of enrollment will not be reached until
the fifth year after implementation. The 1% increase per month in premiums has no effect
on front-loading enrollment, and it is shown that to obtain early enrollment the percentage
increase in premiums would need to be such that it made the premium actuarially unfair. The
new benefit will also impose a sizable crowding-out effect on existing supplemental health
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insurance alternatives; however, it improves their average risk.18 The policy experiments
in this paper have taken as given the co-payment structure of the new prescription drug
benefit. An open question is what would be the optimal policy, i.e., the one that maximizes
the expected benefits subject to spending the same amount as the current policy. Future
work will explore this issue by parameterizing the thresholds of the actuarial design of the
benefit in order to find the optimal policy.
18The partial equilibrium approach adopted in this paper is not able to predict the likely decrease in
premia of the existing alternatives that may be caused by the improvement of their average risk. Therefore,
enrollment in the new option may be overpredicted. Future research using a general equilibrium framework
will address this interesting issue.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Utility function
ua =
1
θ1
Cθ1a + θ2I{Ha = 2}+ θ3I{Ha = 3}+ θ4Rxa + θ5oa + θ6ia + (19)
θ7I{hia 6= hia−1}+
K∑
k=1
θ7+kI{type = k}I{hia = 6 or hia = 7}+ ε
J
a
10.2 Income
lnYa =
K∑
k=1
θ9+kI{type = k}+ θ12I{ea = 2}+ θ13I{ea = 3} (20)
+θ14I{ea = 4}+ θ15I{ea = 5}+ a(θ16 + θ17a) + ε
y
a
10.3 Inpatient care
Pr(ia > 0) =
exp(θ18 + θ19I{Ha = 2}+ θ20I{Ha = 3}+ a(θ21 + θ22a)
1 + exp(θ18 + θ19I{Ha = 2}+ θ20I{Ha = 3}+ a(θ21 + θ22a)
(21)
ln ia =
K∑
k=1
θ22+kI{type = k}+ θ25I{Ha = 2}+ θ26{Ha = 3}+ ε
i
a (22)
10.4 Health production function
Pr(Ha+1 = 0|Ha = h) =
exp(κh1 − η
hZa)
1 + exp(κh1 − η
hZa)
Pr(Ha+1 = 1|Ha = h) =
exp(κh2 − η
hZa)
1 + exp(κh2 − η
hZa)
−
exp(κh1 − η
hZa)
1 + exp(κh1 − η
hZa)
(23)
Pr(Ha+1 = 2|Ha = h) =
exp(κh3 − η
hZa)
1 + exp(κh3 − η
hZa)
−
exp(κh2 − η
hZa)
1 + exp(κh2 − η
hZa)
Pr(Ha+1 = 3|Ha = h) = 1−
exp(κh3 − η
hZa)
1 + exp(κh3 − η
hZa)
ηhZa = Rxa(θ
h
27 + θ
h
28Rxa) + oa(θ
h
29 + θ
h
30oa) + ia(θ
h
31 + θ
h
32ia) + θ
h
33Rxaoa +
θh34Rxaia + θ
h
35oaia + θ
h
36S +
K∑
k=1
θh36+kI{type = k}a (24)
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Figure 1: Medicare Part D coverage for seniors with income above 150% of Poverty Line
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Figure 2: Diagram of supplemental health insurance options available to the elderly
40
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.10
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
Age
T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
 o
f 
d
o
ll
a
rs
Data Simulation
Figure 3: Average prescription drug expenditure by age
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Figure 4: Average outpatient care expenditure by age
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Figure 5: Average inpatient care expenditure by age
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Figure 6: Probability of having any inpatient care event by age
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Figure 7: Average prescription drug expenditure by health status
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Figure 8: Average outpatient care expenditure by health status
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Figure 9: Average inpatient care expenditure by health status
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Figure 10: Average income by age
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Figure 11: Average and out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditure by age after the policy
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Figure 12: Average outpatient care expenditure after the policy
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Figure 13: Part D take-up rate by year of implementation
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Figure 14: Number of enrollees below and above 150% of poverty line that enroll in Part D
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Figure 15: Crowding-out effect on the existing supplemental insurance options
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Figure 16: Health status of enrollees by their choice of health insurance
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Figure 17: Effect on enrollment of the percentage increase in the Part D premium
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Average St. Dev. Min Max
Health insurance
FFS only 0.06
FFS + self-purch. Medigap w/ Rx covg. 0.10
FFS + empl.-prov. ins. w/ Rx covg. 0.22
FFS + self-purch. Medigap w/o Rx covg. 0.36
FFS + empl.-prov. ins. w/o Rx covg. 0.11
Medicare HMO w/ Rx covg. 0.12
Medicare HMO w/o Rx covg. 0.03
Expenditure on medical care
Prescription drugs 0.89 0.85 0.00 6.11
Outpatient care 3.12 3.11 0.34 7.52
Inpatient care 2.37 7.34 0.00 89.11
Prob. of any inpatient event 0.19
Inpatient care condtl. on any 12.21 12.58 0.30 89.11
Percentage paid out-of-pocket
Prescription drugs 0.71 0.34 0.00 1.00
Prescription drugs condtl. on having coverage 0.49 0.30 0.00 0.65
Outpatient care 0.14 0.25 0.00 1.00
Inpatient care 0.03 0.10 0.00 1.00
Demographics
Proportion in excellent/very good health 0.48
Proportion in good health 0.32
Proportion in poor/fair health 0.20
Age 79.06 6.66 68 95
Years of education 11.45 3.08 1 18
Log(income) 9.53 0.69 4.99 13.59
Ever smoked 0.44
Employer-provided health insurance 0.33
Expenditures in thousands of 1999 dollars
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Table 2: Average medical care expenditure by health status
Health status Drugs Outpatient Inpatient Inpatient > 0
1 1.25 4.17 4.18 13.77
(1.00) (3.22) (10.2) (14.56)
2 0.99 3.41 2.27 11.82
(0.89) (3.18) (6.83) (11.41)
3 0.68 2.43 1.44 10.99
(0.66) (2.82) (5.69) (11.89)
The health states are: 1=poor/fair, 2=good, 3=excellent/very good.
Expenditures in thousands of 1999 dollars.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 3: Health state transitions (percentage)
Health status at age a + 1
Health status at age a 0 1 2 3 Frequency
1 3.03 63.09 24.21 9.68 661
2 1.70 18.87 50.27 29.16 1,118
3 1.04 4.97 23.43 70.56 1,831
The health states are: 0=dead, 1=poor/fair, 2=good, 3=excellent/very good.
51
Table 4: Health insurance transitions (percentage)
Health insurance choice at age a + 1
Health ins.
choice at age a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Frequency
1 90.99 0.43 0.00 3.43 0.00 3.86 1.29 233
2 0.55 61.88 6.08 26.52 2.76 1.66 0.55 362
3 0.24 3.58 84.71 2.03 8.48 0.96 0.00 837
4 0.91 7.51 0.45 85.29 2.96 2.58 0.30 1,319
5 0.25 1.99 14.18 15.17 66.67 1.74 0.00 402
6 0.26 0.00 0.53 0.79 0.53 86.84 11.05 380
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.60 0.00 45.45 51.95 77
Frequency 230 362 796 1,312 390 429 91
The health insurance options are:
1:Fee-for-service only
2:Fee-for-service + self-purchased Medigap with Rx coverage
3:Fee-for-service + employer-provided insurance with Rx coverage
4:Fee-for-service + self-purchased Medigap without Rx coverage
5:Fee-for-service + employer-provided insurance without Rx coverage
6:Medicare HMO with Rx coverage
7:Medicare HMO without Rx coverage
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Table 5: Characteristics of the insurance options
Premium Copayments (percentage)
($) Drugs Outpat. Inpat.
FFS only 532 1.00 0.50 0.11
FFS + self-purch. Medigap w/Rx covg. 2,159 0.50 0.21 0.01
FFS + empl.-prov. ins. w/Rx covg. 1,393 0.37 0.23 0.02
FFS + self-purch. Medigap w/o Rx covg. 1,900 1.00 0.23 0.01
FFS + empl.-prov. ins. w/o Rx covg. 1,467 1.00 0.26 0.05
Medicare HMO w/Rx covg. 242 0.47 0.20 0.01
Medicare HMO w/o Rx covg. 430 1.00 0.19 0.01
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Table 6: Parameter estimates
Description θ θˆ
Utility function
CRRA parameter θ1 0.28
(0.013)
Marginal utility good health θ2 11.32
(0.214)
Marginal utility excellent health θ3 22.55
(0.134)
Marginal (dis)utility of Rxa θ4 -0.61
(0.021)
Marginal (dis)utility of oa θ5 -0.70
(0.06)
Marginal (dis)utility of ia θ6 -0.00068
(0.010)
Health insurance switching cost θ7 -2.87
(0.088)
HMO network cost type I θ8 -6.02
(0.136)
HMO network cost type II θ9 0.53
(0.113)
Income
Constant type I θ10 9.49
(0.045)
Constant typeII θ11 9.52
(0.063)
Coeff. on high-school dropout θ12 0.15
(0.003)
Coeff. on high-school graduate θ13 0.42
(0.002)
Coeff. on college dropout θ14 0.75
(0.003)
Coeff. on college graduate θ15 1.16
(0.003)
Coeff. on a θ16 0.00023
(0.0006)
Coeff. on a2 θ17 -0.00009
(0.00004)
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Table 6: Parameter estimates (continued)
Description θ θˆ
Probability of any inpatient event
Constant θ18 -1.21
(0.367)
Coeff. on medium health θ19 -0.80
(0.189)
Coeff. on good health θ20 -0.92
(0.206)
Coeff. on a θ21 -0.0074
(0.005)
Coeff. on a2 θ22 0.00015
(0.00001)
Inpatient expenditure
Constant type I θ23 9.37
(0.067)
Constant type II θ24 8.63
(0.126)
Coeff. on good health θ25 -0.25
(0.122)
Coeff. on excellent health θ26 -0.56
(0.110)
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Table 6: Parameter estimates (continued)
Description θ θˆ θ θˆ θ θˆ
Health prod. tech.
Coeff. on Rxa θ
1
27 0.20 θ
2
27 0.11 θ
3
27 0.10
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Coeff. on Rx2a θ
1
28 -0.0015 θ
2
28 -0.0007 θ
3
28 -0.004
(0.002) (0.0009) (0.002)
Coeff. on oa θ
1
29 0.18 θ
2
29 0.09 θ
3
29 0.09
(0.011) (0.005) (0.007)
Coeff. on o2a θ
1
30 -0.0006 θ
2
30 -0.0012 θ
3
30 -0.0014
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.001)
Coeff. on ia θ
1
31 0.02 θ
2
31 0.04 θ
3
31 0.09
(0.012) (0.002) (0.016)
Coeff. on i2a θ
1
32 -0.00009 θ
2
32 -0.0001 θ
3
32 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.00003) (0.0004)
Coeff. on Rxaoa θ
1
33 -0.026 θ
2
33 -0.06 θ
3
33 -0.05
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001)
Coeff. on Rxaia θ
1
34 -0.005 θ
2
34 -0.008 θ
3
34 -0.02
(0.011) (0.050) (0.223)
Coeff. on oaia θ
1
35 -0.003 θ
2
35 -0.002 θ
3
35 -0.005
(0.002) (0.004) 0.053
Coeff. on smoke θ136 -0.75 θ
2
36 -0.95 θ
3
36 -0.74
0.057 0.037 0.073
Coeff. on a type I θ137 -0.075 θ
2
37 -0.09 θ
3
37 -0.08
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.001)
Coeff. on a type II θ138 -0.072 θ
2
38 -0.077 θ
3
38 -0.05
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.001)
Cutoff death-poor κ11 -8.89 κ
2
1 -11.38 κ
3
1 -11.51
(0.052) (0.099) (0.258)
Cutoff poor-good κ12 -4.35 κ
2
2 -8.57 κ
3
2 -9.29
(0.082) (0.059) (0.145)
Cutoff good-excellent κ13 -2.61 κ
2
3 -5.92 κ
3
3 -6.88
(0.147) (0.050) (0.098)
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 6: Parameter estimates (continued)
Description θ θˆ
Type probability
Constant θ39 -7.67
(0.859)
Previous health ins. θ40 13.07
(0.397)
Age θ41 0.07
(0.009)
Good health θ42 0.29
(0.338)
Excellent health θ43 0.96
(0.352)
Education θ44 1.34
(0.222)
Smoke θ45 0.21
(0.260)
Empl. prov. health ins θ46 -0.69
(0.249)
S.d. of income shock σy 0.18
(0.023)
S.d. of inpat. exp. shock σi 0.91
(0.024)
Discount factor δ 0.95
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 7: Marginal effects of medical care (10% increase)
Health status Drugs Outpatient Inpatient
1 2.9 4.1 -0.1
2 1.2 0.7 1.9
3 0.5 0.3 0.3
The health states are: 1=poor/fair, 2=good,
3=Excellent/Very good.
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Table 8: Health state transitions (percentage)
Health status at age a+ 1
Health status at age a 0 1 2 3
1 Data 3.03 63.09 24.21 9.68
Simulation 3.19 65.16 23.51 8.13
2 Data 1.70 18.87 50.27 29.16
Simulation 2.69 23.91 48.39 25.00
3 Data 1.04 4.97 23.43 70.56
Simulation 0.46 3.54 24.78 71.22
The health states are: 0=dead, 1=poor/fair, 2=good,
3=excellent/very good.
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Table 9: Health insurance transitions (percentage)
Health insurance choice at age a+ 1
Health insurance
choice at age a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Data 90.99 0.43 0.00 3.43 0.00 3.86 1.29
Simul. 83.83 6.80 1.47 4.18 1.20 0.58 1.94
2 Data 0.55 61.88 6.08 26.52 2.76 1.66 0.55
Simul. 3.58 81.59 1.40 10.49 1.04 0.42 1.48
3 Data 0.24 3.58 84.71 2.03 8.48 0.96 0.00
Simul. 3.29 4.05 81.22 2.81 7.53 0.27 0.82
4 Data 0.91 7.51 0.45 85.29 2.96 2.58 0.30
Simul. 5.31 7.59 1.57 81.97 1.18 0.54 1.84
5 Data 0.25 1.99 14.18 15.17 66.67 1.74 0.00
Simul. 5.72 7.5 7.78 4.92 72.22 0.50 1.36
6 Data 0.26 0.00 0.53 0.79 0.53 86.84 11.05
Simul. 7.05 6.19 1.91 5.00 1.89 65.16 12.8
7 Data 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.60 0.00 45.45 51.95
Simul. 1.64 1.41 0.51 1.06 0.38 37.79 57.22
The health insurance options are:
1:Fee-for-service only
2:Fee-for-service + self-purchased Medigap with Rx coverage
3:Fee-for-service + employer-provided insurance with Rx coverage
4:Fee-for-service + self-purchased Medigap without Rx coverage
5:Fee-for-service + employer-provided insurance without Rx coverage
6:Medicare HMO with Rx coverage
7:Medicare HMO without Rx coverage
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Table 10: Policy impact by survivor category (average)
Baseline Policy % change
All
Prescription drugs 0.95 1.18 24.2%
Outpatient care 2.68 2.77 3.3%
Inpatient care 2.53 2.53 0.3%
Out-of-pocket payments 1.24 0.64 -48.3%
Consumption 15.52 18.55 19.5%
Mortality (years) 1.07 0.95 -10.6%
Anyway survivors
Prescription drugs 0.99 1.13 14.1%
Outpatient care 2.83 2.71 -4.2%
Inpatient care 2.77 2.39 -13.7%
Out-of-pocket payments 1.32 0.63 -52.2%
Consumption 16.40 19.18 16.9%
Proportion in bad health 0.304 0.287
Proportion in medium health 0.303 0.308
Proportion in good health 0.393 0.405
New Survivors
Prescription drugs 0.69 1.45 110.1%
Outpatient care 1.89 3.20 69.3%
Inpatient care 1.59 3.15 98.1%
Out-of-pocket payments 0.84 0.65 -22.6%
Consumption 10.62 16.64 56.6%
Proportion in bad health 0.47∗ 0.63
Proportion in medium health 0.43∗ 0.28
Proportion in good health 0.10∗ 0.09
∗Before dying
Expenditures in thousands of dollars
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Table 11: Percentage financed with premiums
Year Percentage financed
1 18.2
2 26.2
3 28.6
4 28.7
5 29.1
6 28.3
7 28.5
8 27.7
9 27.6
10 27.1
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